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Arbitration by Accident: The
Consequence of Unintentionally
Meeting the Clear and Unmistakable
Evidence Standard
Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp.]
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental principle of arbitration law is that parties may only be com-
pelled to submit an issue to arbitration if they agreed to do so. 2 The question of
when an arbitrator, instead of a district court, can decide the arbitrability of an
issue has been taken up by the courts in recent years. In First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan,3 the Supreme Court stated that an arbitrator may decide questions
of arbitrability only when the parties have "clearly and unmistakably" agreed to
defer such questions to an arbitrator.4 Since First Options, the lower courts have
attempted to define when parties have satisfied the clear and unmistakable stan-
dard. The question of what constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence remains
to be definitively answered. Must it be an express statement of an agreement
developed through the bargaining process, or can it be something less, like a boi-
lerplate arbitration provision that incorporates intent through an outside docu-
ment? The Supreme Court has only issued minimal guidance on the subject.
The courts of appeals that have ruled on the issue have generally decided that
the "clear and unmistakable evidence" requirement may be satisfied when parties
incorporate the rules of an arbitration forum into their agreement.5 If those rules
call for an arbitrator to decide the question of arbitrability, then the courts have
deemed the requirement to be met. In Qualcomm v. Nokia,6 the Federal Circuit
held that the parties clearly and unmistakably intended to delegate the issue of
determining arbitrability to an arbitrator by incorporating the American Arbitra-
tion Association's (AAA) rules into their agreement. 7 The Federal Circuit's deci-
sion in Qualcomm also adds a new twist to the analysis by instructing that if a
district court finds the requisite clear and unmistakable intent, it should then per-
form a second "wholly groundless" inquiry prior to submitting the issue to arbitra-
.8tion. This casenote examines the potential consequences of the Federal Circuit's
ruling in Qualcomm.
1. 466 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
2. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 944 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 49 (1986)).
5. See Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2005); Apollo Computer, Inc.
v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1989); Terminix Int'l Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. P'ship, 432 F.3d 1327
(1 th Cir. 2005).
6. 466 F. 3d 1366.
7. Id. at 1372-73.
8. Id. at 1373.
1
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II. FACTS & HOLDING
Nokia Corporation (Nokia) is in the business of manufacturing wireless
phones and infrastructure equipment used by wireless telephone service carriers. 9
In the field of wireless telecommunications, Qualcomm Inc. (Qualcomm) obtained
several patents for their ground-breaking innovations in developing two technolo-
gies, the Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) standard and the Global System
for Mobile Communications (GSM) standard.' 0 These standards are essential for
mobile stations and infrastructure equipment to function properly.
In a contract dated July 2001 (the "2001 Agreement"), Qualcomm gave No-
kia a license permitting Nokia to manufacture products that integrated Qual-
comm's patented CDMA technology.'" An arbitration clause in the 2001 Agree-
ment specified that any controversy arising out of the contract between the two
parties would be submitted to an arbitrator pursuant to the rules of the American
Arbitration Association (AAA).'
2
In November 2005, Qualcomm filed a complaint against Nokia for patent in-
fringement in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Califor-
nia. 13 Nokia responded with two actions: (1) they commenced an arbitration
proceeding, and (2) they filed two motions with the district court.'
4
Through the arbitration proceeding, Nokia sought an arbitrator's ruling on
two issues. 15 As to the first, Nokia asserted an estoppel defense, claiming that
Qualcomm took certain misleading actions which caused Nokia to believe that
Qualcomm did not actually hold the patents that Qualcomm claimed Nokia had
infringed upon in its complaint.' 6 As to its second issue, Nokia asserted that they
held a valid license under the 2001 Agreement to incorporate Qualcomm's pa-
tented CDMA technology into the products they manufacture.'
7
Nokia also filed two motions with the district court.'8 First, Nokia moved to
stay the district court action in accordance with Section 3 of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA), which provides that the court shall stay the trial to allow for an
arbitration if the court is "satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceed-
ing is referable to arbitration under.., an agreement." 19 Secondly, Nokia filed a
9. Id. at 1368. Nokia Corporation and Nokia, Inc. are the named appellants in this appeal of the
district court's denial of its motion to stay pending arbitration. Id..
10. Id. Qualcomm Inc. and SnapTrack Inc. are the appellees in this appeal. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The contract further states that the 2001 Agreement will be interpreted in accordance with
the law of the state of California. Id.
13. Id. In its complaint, Qualcomm alleged that Nokia had infringed on twelve patents held by
Qualcomm. Id.
14. Id. at 1368- 69.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1368.
17. Id. at 1368-69. Nokia wished to assert these two claims as affirmative defenses to Qualcomrn's
claims of patent infringement. In Footnote 1 of its opinion, the Court observes that Nokia was wary of
asserting these affirmative defenses in an answer filed in the district court for fear that by so doing,
they would waive their right to seek arbitration. Therefore, Nokia first asserted these affirmative de-
fenses in its motion to stay, and not in its answer. Id. at 1369 n.1.
18. Id. at 1369.
19. Id. Section 3 of the FAA provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue re-
ferable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such
[Vol. 2007
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motion to dismiss Qualcomm's complaint, or alternatively, for a more definite
statement.2 ° On March 14, 2006, the district court denied Nokia's motion to stay
and motion to dismiss.2 1 The court found that the Nokia products at issue in
Qualcomm's complaint involved patents separate from those protecting the
CDMA technology.2 2 Since the arbitration agreement covered only CDMA pa-
tents, the court concluded that the issues alleged in the complaint were beyond the
scope of the 2001 Agreement. Therefore, the arbitration clause was meaningless
for the purpose of resolving the dispute.23
The court granted Nokia's request for a more definite statement, and as a re-
sult Qualcomm amended its complaint to state that their claims were based on
Nokia's products incorporating the GSM, not the CDMA technology.24 The
amended complaint then expressly excluded from the lawsuit any Nokia product
related to the license held under the 2001 Agreement.25
In response to the amended complaint, Nokia alleged that there was a dispute
over which of their products was licensed under the 2001 Agreement.26 Nokia
argued that the amended complaint, by referencing the 3rd Generation Partnership
Project, called into question another technology that Nokia maintains they held a
license to under the 2001 Agreement.27 This third standard is known as Universal
Mobile Telecommunications Systems (UMTS), a distinct standard apart from
GSM and CDMA.28 According to Nokia, Qualcomm's amended complaint al-
leged patent infringement by both UMTS and GSM products made by Nokia but
excludes from the lawsuit products licensed under the 2001 Agreement." How-
ever, Nokia alleged that the agreement included UMTS products. 3 As a result of
this apparent discrepancy, Nokia claimed that there was a dispute as to which




Subsequently, Nokia filed, and the district court granted, a motion to stay
pending an appeal of the denial of the motion to dismiss to the United States Court
suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable
to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of
the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, pro-
viding the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000).
20. Qualcommn, 466 F.3d at 1369.
21. Id.
22. id.
23. Id. In its Order, the court stated that "the Court is not satisfied under 9 U.S.C. § 3 that the issues
involved in the instant case are referable to arbitration .... Id.
24. Id. "Nokia manufactures ... products that comply with the GSM family of standards and tech-




27. Id. The 3 rd Generation Partnership Project promulgates standards for UMTS. Paragraph 23 of
the Amended Complaints alleges that Nokia's UMTS are products of infringement, but paragraph 24
excludes products licensed under the 2001 Agreement, which Nokia believes includes UMTS products.
28. Id. at 1369 n.2.
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of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 32 On this appeal, Nokia and Qualcomm pre-
sented to the circuit court differing opinions as to when it is appropriate for an
arbitrator to decide the arbitrability of an issue. Section 3 of the FAA states that if
a district court is "satisfied" that the issue involved in a suit brought before it is
referable to arbitration under an agreement between the parties, then the court
should stay the trial of the action and refer the matter to arbitration in accordance
with the agreement.
33
Nokia contended that when the district court finds that the parties "clearly and
unmistakably" intended to arbitrate the arbitrability of an issue, then the court
meets Section 3's satisfaction requirement and must stay the proceeding pending
the arbitrator's decision. 34 In contrast, Qualcomm argued that the district court
should determine, on its own, the arbitrability of an issue in order to be satisfied
that the issue is in fact arbitrable.
35
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court,
holding that a stay of judicial proceedings is only proper when the parties' intent
to arbitrate issues of arbitrability is clear and unmistakable and when the claim of
arbitrability is not "wholly groundless."
36
11. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In passing the FAA, Congress avowed a policy favoring arbitration. 37 Ac-
cording to Section 3 of the FAA, a district court must stay the judicial proceeding
if it is "satisfied" that the issue involved is arbitrable. 38 This "arbitrability" ques-
tion has been defined as "whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute
to arbitration." 39 Examples of questions of arbitrability include whether the par-
ties are bound by an arbitration clause and whether a dispute between parties is
covered by an arbitration clause in a binding contract. 40 The scope of the term is
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1370.
34. Id. In Footnote 3 of the opinion, the Circuit Court notes Nokia conceded during oral argument
that the district court should not be required to stay the trial if a claim of arbitrability were wholly
groundless, even if the agreement "clearly and unmistakably" manifested an intention to have an
arbitrator decide issues of arbitrability. l at 1371 n.3.
35. Id. at 1370-71.
36. Id. at 1371.
If the court concludes that the parties did not clearly and unmistakably intend to delegate arbitra-
bility decisions to an arbitrator, the general rule that the "question of arbitrability... is... for
judicial determination" applies and the court should undertake a full arbitrability inquiry in order
to be "satisfied" that the issue involved is referable to arbitration.... If the district court finds
that the assertion of arbitrability is "wholly groundless," then it may conclude that it is not satis-
fied under section 3, and deny the moving party's request for a stay.
Id. (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc., v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
37. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
38. 9 U.S.C. § 3. ("[The court ... upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or pro-
ceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall... stay the trial of the action .... ).
39. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (citing AT&T Techs., Inc., v.
Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643,49 (1986)).
40. Id. at 84 (citing AT&T Techs., Inc., v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
[Vol. 2007
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limited and does not apply to other procedural gateway questions, such as whether
41the claim is barred by a statute of limitations.
A. Guidance from U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
According to the United States Supreme Court, the general rule is that the dis-
trict courts have the duty to decide arbitrability.42 In AT&T v. Communications
Workers of America,43 the Court faced the issue of whether courts must first de-
termine whether the parties intended to arbitrate a disagreement before granting a
request to send the issue to an arbitrator.44 The dispute arose when AT&T decided
to lay off a number of union workers, causing the Union to believe AT&T had
violated a provision of the collective bargaining agreement.45 The collective bar-
gaining agreement required that a dispute between the parties over their respective
obligations or over the interpretation of the agreement must be submitted to an
arbitrator upon the request of either party.46 The district court ruled that the thre-
shold question of arbitrability in this case was to be decided by the arbitrator.47
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing its fear that judicial determination of the
question might result in the court weighing the merits of the claim.
48
In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court held that deciding whether an
agreement requires the parties to arbitrate "is undeniably an issue for judicial de-
termination." 9 Under this holding, the district court has the duty to make the
initial determination of whether the dispute in question should be submitted to an
arbitrator, without ruling on the merits of the dispute.
5 0
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has refined this general rule. In First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,5 1 the Court held that whether a court or an
arbitrator should decide the question of arbitrability depends on what the parties
agreed to.5 2 If the parties agreed to have an arbitrator decide, then the arbitrator
should in fact be the one who decides whether the issue is arbitrable.5 3 On the
other hand, if the parties did not make such an agreement, then the general rule
applies, and the court has the duty to decide arbitrability in the same manner it
would decide any other issue that was not submitted to arbitration.54 The Court
set forth a standard of "clear and unmistakable evidence" for determining whether
41. Id. at 84-85 (citing AT&T Techs., Inc., v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649
(1986)).
42. AT&T Techs., Inc., v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 644.
45. Id. at 645-46.
46. Id. at 644-45.
47. Id. at 647 (quoting App. To Pet. For Cert. 1 A, Commc'm Workers of Am. v. W. Elec. Co., 751
F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1984)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 649. "Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator." Id. (citing
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. 363 U.S.574, 582-83 (1960)).
50. Id. (citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546 (1964)).
51. 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
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the parties agreed to have an arbitrator answer the question of arbitrability. 55 In
explaining the clear and unmistakable evidence standard, the Court noted that it is
a higher standard than that which is normally applied to an arbitration question.56
Normally, the Court has instructed that uncertainties regarding arbitration issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration.57 However, in making the initial call as
to whether the parties intended a court or an arbitrator to make the arbitrability
decision, the Court requires a higher standard of proof to override the general rule
that calls for judicial determination. 58
In First Options, the court concluded that the parties had not met this stan-
dard, and therefore the district court had jurisdiction over the arbitrability deci-
sion.59 The Kaplans had not signed the agreement which contained the relevant
arbitration clause, and the fact that the Kaplans filed a written memorandum ob-
jecting to the arbitrator's ability to hear the case did not evince a willingness to be
bound by the arbitrator's decision. 60 First Options stands for the proposition that
the Supreme Court is willing to let the parties to an agreement determine who
should make the arbitrability judgment, as long as their intent to do so is clear and
unmistakable. However, how parties to an agreement are to show this intent re-
mained undefined.
In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.6 1 the Court was asked to hold that
the clear and unmistakable standard may be met by either a broad arbitration
clause stating that any and all disputes would be submitted to arbitration, or in the
alternative, by incorporating the rules of an arbitration forum such as the National
62Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). 2 In reaching its decision, the Court
declined to adopt either argument and instead clarified the nuances of the defini-
tion of arbitrability.63
The agreement between the parties in Howsam provided that all controversies
arising out of the agreement were to be submitted to arbitration and allowed How-
sam to select the arbitration forum to be used by the parties.64 At issue in the case
was whether the court or an arbitrator should apply one of the provisions of the
NASD's rules, which Howsam had selected to use.65 The NASD provision in
question stated that a dispute may not be submitted to arbitration if six years had
66passed since the dispute arose. Dean Witter asked the court to apply the NASD
provision and to enjoin Howsam from submitting the issue to arbitration. 67 How-
55. Id. at 944 (citing At&T Techs. Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
56. See id.at 944-45.
57. Id. at 945 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 947.
60. Id. at 941 n.59, 946.
61. 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
62. See Brief for the Petioner at 32-40, Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 537 U.S. 79 (2002)
(No. 01-800); Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separabili-
ty: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819, 866
(2003).
63. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-84 (2002).
64. Id. at 81-82.
65. Id. at 82-83
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sam asked the court to stay the action and submit the matter to arbitration. Ac-
cording to Howsam, a broad arbitration clause or a clause which incorporates the
arbitration rules of a forum (the NASD), should be sufficient to satisfy the clear
and unmistakable requirement and allow an arbitrator to decide arbitrability ques-
tions.68 In reversing the district court, the Tenth Circuit found that the provision
concerned the dispute's arbitrability, and therefore it applied the general rule that
the district court should decide such questions.69
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's ruling, concluding that the
NASD time limit provision should be determined by an arbitrator, not by a district
court.7 ° The Court's analysis began with a reminder that arbitration is a matter of
contract law, and that no party should be compelled to submit a dispute to arbitra-
tion unless they agreed to do so.71 The Court then noted that the general rule that
arbitrability is a question for judicial determination is an exception to the federal
policy favoring arbitration, and it may only be disregarded if the parties clearly
and unmistakably provide otherwise.7 The question for the Court to resolve was
whether the application of the NASD time limit is an issue that falls within the
scope of "arbitrability.
' 73
The Court made a distinction between disputes involving whether the parties
to an agreement are bound by an arbitration clause, which raises a question of
arbitrability for judicial determination, from procedural questions arising from the
dispute itself, which are generally for an arbitrator to decide.74 Examples of the
second type include time limits, notice, estoppel, and other similar defenses. 75
The Court found that the NASD time limit was akin to the latter group of ques-
tions and, therefore, held that the matter should have been submitted to arbitra-
76tion.
Importantly, the Court did not even acknowledge Howsam's argument that
the parties expressed the clear and unmistakable intent necessary to override the
general rule by incorporating the rules of the NASD, which call for arbitrators to
decide arbitrability questions. 7
B. Incorporating Clear and Unmistakable Intent in the Circuit Courts
Even though the Supreme Court declined to do so, several of the Circuit
Courts have determined that one way for the parties to show the requisite clear
and unmistakable intent is by incorporating into their agreement the rules of an
68. Brief for the Petitioner at 32-40; Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 537 U.S. 79 (2002)
(No. 01-800).
69. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 82.
70. Id. at 84.
71. Id. at 83 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960)).
72. Id. (quoting AT&T Techs. Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986); First
Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan 514 U.S. 938,941 (1995)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 84 (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 85.
76. Id.
77. Reuben, supra note 62, at 867.
No. 2]
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arbitration forum, such as the AAA. In Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co.,78
the Second Circuit found that the parties satisfied the clear and unmistakable evi-
dence standard because their agreement incorporated the AAA rules. 79  The
agreement stated that in the event the parties are unable to resolve a dispute on
their own, the issue would be submitted to an arbitrator, who would be obligated
to utilize the rules of the AAA in reaching their decision. 80 The AAA grants the
arbitrator the authority to determine issues of arbitrability. 81 Therefore, the court
found such an action constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence of the intent to
have an arbitrator decide the issue.
82
Similarly, in Apollo Computer v. Berg,83 the First Circuit held that an agree-
ment incorporating the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
satisfied the clear and unmistakable evidence standard, since the rules of the ICC
called for an arbitrator to determine arbitrability. 84 In Terminix International Co.
v. Palmer Ranch, LTD. Parnership,85 the Eleventh Circuit likewise found that an
agreement adopting the AAA rules was clear and unmistakable evidence that the
parties intended for an arbitrator to decide arbitrability. 86 In Terminix, the court
merely cited to the Contec and Apollo decisions as the reason why they were "able
to avoid" the analysis necessary to find clear and unmistakable evidence of the
parties' intent.
87
C. California Courts Add to the Test
California courts suggest that their state law is consistent with the federal case
law on the issue of who is the appropriate party to determine arbitrability. In
Dream Theater, Inc. v. Dream Theater,88 the California Court of Appeal for the
Second District noted that California courts have a common practice of looking to
federal law when deciding state arbitration law issues. 89 In Dream Theater, the
court applied the federal standard that courts should decide the question of arbi-
trability unless the parties can show clear and unmistakable evidence of their in-
tention to have an arbitrator make that decision. 9° However, prior to staying the
proceeding to allow an arbitrator to rule on the arbitrability of the issue, the trial
court is charged with the additional task of determining whether the claim is
78. 398 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2005).
79. Id. at 208 (citations omitted).
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND
MEDIATION PROCEDURES, R.7(a)). "The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own
jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration
agreement." AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND
MEDIATION PROCEDURES, R.7(a) (2005), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440#R7.
82. Contec, 398 F.3d at 208.
83. 886 F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1989).
84. Id. at 473.
85. 432 F.3d 1327 (11 th Cir. 2005).
86. Id. at 1332.
87. Id. at 1332-33.
88. 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
89. Id. at 326.
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"wholly groundless." 91 In making this determination, the trial court is necessarily
required to engage in some interpretation of the agreement. 92 This additional
inquiry essentially requires a trial court to weigh the merits of the arbitration
claim, and as a result, prevent some cases from going to arbitration.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The statutory language of the FAA requires the district court to be "satisfied"
with the arbitrability of the issue in dispute before granting a stay. 93 Therefore, in
the instant case, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals had to decide if the district
court performed the proper inquiry in determining whether to stay the judicial
proceeding to allow for an arbitration hearing. 94 Thus, the court began its analysis
by trying to determine who had the authority to decide arbitrability, the district
court or the arbitrator.
95
The Federal Circuit first reiterated the general rule promulgated by the Su-
preme Court in AT&T, stating that the issue of arbitrability is generally for the
court to resolve. 96 Despite the general rule, the court next stated that the parties'
intent, as evidenced by their agreement, controls the question of who should de-
cide whether an issue is arbitrable.97 The court explained that clear and unmistak-
able evidence is the standard used to determine whether the parties intended to
have an arbitrator resolve the arbitrability of the issue.98 Finally, the court noted
that, while the 2001 Agreement was to be governed by California law, California
law mirrored federal law on questions regarding arbitrability. 99 Therefore, the
court needed to determine whether the parties to the 2001 Agreement clearly and
unmistakably intended to have the arbitrability of their dispute decided by an arbi-
trator.
To answer this question, the Federal Circuit looked to the analysis employed
in Contec, where the Second Circuit concluded that the parties, by expressly
adopting the Rules of the AAA in their agreement, had established the clear and
unmistakable intent to refer the question to an arbitrator.1°° The court explained
that because the AAA rules grant arbitrators the authority to determine arbitrabili-
ty, adopting those rules demonstrates the clear and unmistakable intent necessary
to override the general rule and allow an arbitrator to determine such an issue.'
0
'
Therefore, the court found that by incorporating the AAA rules in their agreement,
91. Id. (citing McCarroll v. L.A. County etc. Carpenters, 49 Cal. 3d 45 (1957)).
92. Id. (citing Freeman v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 14 Cal. 3d 473 (1975)).
93. Qualcomm, Inc. v. Nokia Corp. 466 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
94. Id. at 1371-72.
95. Id. at 1372.
96. Id. ("The question of arbitrability... is undeniably an issue for judicial determination." (citing
AT&T Techs. Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986))).
97. Id. ("The question who has the primary power to decide arbitrability turns upon what the parties
agreed about that matter." (citing First Options of Chi. Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 941 (1995))).
98. Id. (citing First Options of Chi. Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 941 (1995)).
99. Id. (citing Dream Theater, Inc. v. Dream Theatre, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)).
The 2001 Agreement stated that it should be construed in accordance with California law. Id. at 1372.
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Qualcomm and Nokia had displayed the requisite intent to defer the issue of arbi-
trability to an arbitrator.'
0 2
Having made this determination, the Federal Circuit ruled that a district court
should next perform a second inquiry to determine whether the claim of arbitrabil-
ity was "wholly groundless," as set forth by the California courts. 10 3 According to
the Federal Circuit, the wholly groundless inquiry would prevent a party from
asserting any groundless claim in order to compel arbitration, while at the same
time meeting the "satisfied" requirement of Section 3 of the FAA. °4 Therefore,
the court adopted this second test. 10
5
In the instant decision, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court's ruling
and remanded the action because the district court did not apply the "wholly
groundless" analysis to the two arbitration claims asserted by Nokia. 1° 6 The court
likened the district court's prior analysis to the type of full arbitrability scrutiny
that would be proper had the court initially found that the parties did not clearly
and unmistakably intend to have an arbitrator decide arbitrability.
10 7
In order to make the "wholly groundless" determination, the Federal Circuit
instructed the district court to look at the scope of the arbitration clause as well as
the particular issue in dispute. 08 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit warned the
district court to not make an arbitrability determination on its own on remand, as
that would wrongly encroach on the rights of the arbitrator as set forth by the par-
ties' clear and unmistakable intent in their 2001 Agreement. °9 If the district court
decides that the arbitration claim is not "wholly groundless," then the "satisfied"
requirement of the FAA would be met, and the district court should grant a stay of
the judicial proceedings." 0 However, if the court does not find such evidence,
then the district court should perform the arbitrability analysis itself under the
general rule that the question of arbitrability is for judicial determination. 1 '
V. COMMENT
In Qualcomm, the Federal Circuit made two noteworthy decisions. The first
decision was to adopt the Second Circuit's holding that parties will satisfy the
"clear and unmistakable evidence" standard by incorporating the rules of the AAA
into their agreement.
In First Options, the Supreme Court decided that for an arbitrator to have the
authority to decide questions of arbitrability, the parties must have manifested
their intent to do so by "clear and unmistakable" evidence, despite the general
federal policy favoring arbitration. The rationale behind this decision is that an
arbitration agreement is essentially an agreement to waive one's right to access the
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at n.5 (citing Dream Theater, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 322, 326 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1374-75 (Nokia asserted both an estoppel defense and a license defense),
107. Id. at 1372.
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court system to resolve disputes.' 1 2 The right to access the courts is a fundamental
right of U.S. citizens. Courts should not allow individuals to unintentionally
waive this significant right by signing a contract containing a boilerplate arbitra-
tion clause. This rationale is consistent with the idea that a party must not be
compelled to arbitrate an issue unless they agreed to do so.' Therefore, the
Court in First Options created a higher standard of evidence to supersede the gen-
eral rule that calls for judicial determination of arbitrability questions. An addi-
tional rationale supporting the First Options decision stems from the great amount
of deference reviewing courts give to arbitration decisions.' 4 The determinations
of an arbitrator are rarely overturned by a reviewing court." 5 Furthermore, in
reaching their decisions, arbitrators are not bound to follow the rule of law. Such
heavy consequences associated with waiving one's right to access the courts un-
doubtedly played a role in convincing the Supreme Court to adopt a higher stan-
dard of evidence before compelling a party to submit to arbitration.
In Qualcomm, the Federal Circuit found that since the agreement between the
parties incorporated the AAA rules, and because those rules give the arbitrator the
authority to rule on arbitrability, the parties' incorporation of those rules mani-
fested the necessary "clear and unmistakable" intent to have an arbitrator decide
arbitrability.
The decision to allow incorporation of an arbitration forum's set of rules to
satisfy the clear and unmistakable evidence standard is consistent with the federal
courts' strong pro-arbitration policy. However, as arbitration and arbitration pro-
visions in contracts become more common, it is doubtful that boilerplate arbitra-
tion provisions will reflect what the parties clearly and unmistakably intended.
An inexperienced party could unwittingly discard their constitutional right to
access the court system simply by agreeing to a contract that contains a boilerplate
arbitration clause adopting the rules of the AAA. The potential consequences of
such a result are highlighted by recognizing that arbitrators are not required to be
familiar with the rule of law, and those that know the law may choose to disregard
it in reaching their decision." 6 Since the general rule calls for the district courts to
make arbitrability decisions, contracting parties may fail to focus on who should
make the arbitrability decision in drafting their agreements, believing that this
question will be resolved by a judge." 7 The consequences of this result may be
especially harsh in the context of adhesion contracts, where one party must choose
112. Reuben, supra note 62, at 857.
113. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995); AT&T Techs., Inc. v.
Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570-71,582 (1960).
114. Reuben, supra note 62, at 823.
115. LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 375 (Abridged ed. 3d ed.
2006).
116. See Reuben, supra note 62, at 822-23; RISKIN, supra note 115, at 314-16.
117. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-84 (2002).
The Court has found the phrase [arbitrability] applicable in the kind of narrow circumstance
where contracting parties would likely have expected a court to have decided the gateway matter,
where they are not likely to have thought that they had agreed that an arbitrator would do so, and,
consequently, where reference of the gateway dispute to the court avoids the risk of forcing par-
ties to arbitrate a matter that they may well not have agreed to arbitrate.
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between accepting the agreement on the other party's terms or forego the opportu-
nity to enter into the agreement altogether." 
8
In announcing the clear and unmistakable evidence standard, the Supreme
Court likely did not intend for the standard to be unintentionally met by unwary
contracting parties. Professor Reuben points out that the Court declined the op-
portunity to adopt Howsam's argument that incorporation of an arbitration fo-
rum's rules is sufficient to meet the clear and unmistakable evidence standard.'19
The resulting implication is that the Court does not believe adopting a forum's
rules is enough to satisfy the standard. 120 Professor Reuben notes that the Court
may be moving the law towards a requirement of actual consent before a party
may be compelled to arbitration, a move that is incompatible with an incorpora-
tion argument.' 2' This argument seems persuasive and consistent with the Su-
preme Court's rationale in adopting a higher standard before compelling a party to
submit to arbitration. It is entirely inconsistent for the Court to require a higher
standard of evidence to rebut the general rule but then to allow this requirement to
be accidentally met by merely incorporating an arbitration forum's rules into an
agreement. The results reached by the Federal Circuit in Qualcomm and by the
other Courts of Appeals seem to be incompatible with the Supreme Court's ratio-
nale for adopting the clear and unmistakable evidence standard.
The Federal Circuit's decision in Qualcomm is also significant for its holding
that if a district court finds the parties have met the clear and unmistakable evi-
dence standard, it should perform a "wholly groundless" inquiry before granting a
stay of the judicial action. 122 The purported reason for this second test is to pre-
vent a party from asserting any groundless claim in order to compel the other par-
ty to submit to arbitration.123 However, this requirement conflicts with Supreme
Court precedent. The Court has instructed the district courts to stay the judicial
action upon a finding that the parties clearly and unmistakably intended to have an
arbitrator decide arbitrability questions. The problem with the wholly groundless
inquiry is that it requires the district court to delve into the merits of the dispute,
an act that the Supreme Court has declared impermissible. In AT&T Techs. v.
Communications Workers of America, the Court held that if the district court finds
the parties agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration, then the judicial action should
be stayed, even if the underlying claim- appears to be frivolous: 'The courts,
118. RISKIN, supra note 115, at 366.
119. Reuben, supra note 62, at 867-68.
120. Id. at 869.
121. See Reuben, supra note 62. Professor Reuben believes the Supreme Court may be moving to a
requirement of actual consent before a party may meet the "clear and unmistakable evidence" standard
and be compelled to submit to arbitration. He contrasts this movement with earlier Supreme Court
precedent starting with Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), which
he believes paved the way for allowing implied consent to arbitrate to be sufficient to send a matter to
arbitration. Under Reuben's view, the "incorporation by reference" argument that stands for the prop-
osition that the clear and unmistakable evidence standard may be met by adopting the rules of the
AAA holds little weight. But see Alan Scott Rau, The Arbitrability Question Itself, 10 Am. REV. INT'L
ARB. 287, 331-33, 339 (1999) (questioning whether there is a conflict between Prima Paint and First
Options and which states that the two cases involve different issues); Alan Scott Rau, Everything You
Really Needed to Know About "Separability" in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT'L.
ARB. 1, 29-30 (2003) (directly confronting Reuben's interpretation of Prima Paint).
122. Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
123. Id. at 1373 n.5.
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therefore, have no business weighing the merits of the grievance ... The agree-
ment is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those which the court
will deem meritorious."'' 24 Therefore, the Federal Circuit has adopted a standard
that directly contradicts a longstanding principle of the Supreme Court's arbitra-
tion philosophy.
125
An examination of the advantages and disadvantages of a wholly groundless
inquiry may be helpful in understanding why the Federal Circuit decided to adopt
the test. It must be noted that there are some potential practical advantages to the
wholly groundless inquiry. The time and resources of the parties will be spared
by having a judge dispense with meritless claims at the outset, instead of requiring
the parties to prepare for and present their claims to an arbitrator. The wholly
groundless inquiry may have the additional positive effect of preventing inequita-
ble arbitration results. Courts typically afford great deference to arbitration rul-
ings.' 26 Since arbitrators are not required to follow the rule of law, this could
potentially result in a party succeeding in arbitration with a claim that is wholly
groundless in the eyes of the law, leaving the losing side with little or no re-
course.1
27
However, one could argue that there is little justification for the wholly
groundless inquiry. An agreement to arbitrate is a contract between two parties,
and the intent of the parties should be honored. 28 If the claim is without merit,
then any reasonable fact-finder would be unlikely to rule for that party. In addi-
tion to going against the intent of the parties, the wholly groundless test requires
the court to spend its time and resources weighing the merits of the case. This
result would detract from one of the attractive qualities of arbitration, in that it
relieves court congestion and saves court resources. 129 Additionally, the wholly
groundless analysis requires parties to first argue the merits of their case to the
court in order to have the dispute submitted to arbitration, where the parties will
then have to argue the merits all over again to a different fact-finder.
The wholly groundless inquiry also conflicts with the federal pro-arbitration
policy.' 30 If the parties explicitly agreed to submit all disputes to an arbitrator,
and one of the parties feels he has been wronged in some way, then he should be
able to present his claim to the previously agreed upon fact-finder. The wholly
groundless inquiry has the potential to prevent some disputes from being submit-
ted to arbitration, despite the parties' clear and unmistakable intent to do so. Un-
der a wholly groundless analysis, a district court may prevent issues it deems fri-
volous from arbitration, despite contrary Supreme Court precedent requiring
124. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (citing Steelwork-
ers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
125. See id.
126. RISKIN, supra note 115, at 375.
127. Reuben, supra note 62, at 822-23.
128. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002).
129. RISKIN, supra note 15, at 316.
130. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 US 1, 24-25 (1983).
Section 2 [of the Federal Arbitration Act] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements ... The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal
law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allega-
tion of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.
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courts to submit all issues, frivolous and non-frivolous alike, to arbitration where
the parties' intent to do so is clear.
13 1
Therefore, both parts of the holding expounded by the Federal Circuit go
against policies adopted by the Supreme Court. The two parts of the holding are
also inconsistent with each other in their practical application. The Federal Cir-
cuit's first decision, that incorporating an arbitration forum's rules satisfies the
clear and unmistakable evidence standard, risks sending issues to arbitration that
the parties intended a court to handle. On the other hand, the wholly groundless
test adopted by the Federal Circuit potentially prevents some disputes from being
sent to arbitration despite the parties' clear and unmistakable intent to do so.
The lower courts seem to be reaching decisions that are incompatible with the
Supreme Court's rationale behind First Options, which calls for a higher standard
of proof before a district court should compel a party to submit to arbitration.'
32
The result in Qualcomm exemplifies this inconsistency between the lower courts
decisions and the policy underlying First Options. To avoid such conflict, the
Supreme Court should establish clearer guidance on how to satisfy the "clear and
unmistakable evidence" standard. 133 In Howsam, the Court declined to decide
whether the standard may be met by incorporating the rules of the AAA, suggest-
ing such an act is insufficient.' 34 If the Court intends to require a more express
showing of the parties' intent to meet the "clear and unmistakable evidence" stan-
dard, then the Court should so state.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's decision in Qualcomm should put all contracting parties
on notice that agreements must be carefully drafted to avoid unintentionally satis-
fying the "clear and unmistakable evidence" standard. If the parties' intend to
follow the general rule that arbitrability decisions are a matter for judicial deter-
mination, they should expressly provide for this rule in their contracts. However,
the parties need only insert a boilerplate arbitration provision that adopts the rules
of an arbitration forum, such as the AAA, to trigger the exception to the general
rule. Therefore, while boilerplate language triggers the exception, parties must
draft wisely to have a dispute resolved according to the general rule. This result
conflicts with the Supreme Court's rationale in adopting the "clear and unmistak-
able evidence" standard. Decisions such as First Options and Howsam may indi-
cate the Supreme Court's support for a requirement of actual consent. However,
until the Court gives more guidance as to what is sufficient to meet the "clear and
unmistakable evidence" standard, the lower courts are likely to continue to issue
decisions such as Qualcomm that directly contradict longstanding principles of the
Court.
MARK A. MULCHEK
131. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commnc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) ("The courts,
therefore, have no business weighing the merits of the grievance... [T]he agreement is to submit all
grievances to arbitration, not merely those which the court will deem meritorious.").
132. Reuben, supra note 62, at 861-62.
133. Id. at 866.
134. Id. at 869.
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